The strategic use of debt reconsidered by Haan, M.A., & Toolsema, L.A.,
The strategic use of debt reconsidered
Marco A. Haan and Linda A. Toolsema∗
SOM-Theme E: Financial markets and institutions
Abstract
Wanzenried (2003, International Journal of Industrial Organization
21(2), 171-200) considers a two-stage diﬀerentiated goods duopoly
model with demand uncertainty linking ﬁrms’ capital structure choice
to their output market decisions. Unfortunately, her analysis is
ﬂawed. We correct for this, and solve the model numerically to
ﬁnd some results that are qualitatively diﬀerent from hers. First,
in equilibrium, the use of debt always yields lower ﬁrm proﬁts, i.e.
even in the case of complements. Second, the equilibrium debt level
decreases as demand becomes more volatile. We also discuss some
problems with the debt contract commonly used in the strategic
debt literature.
Keywords: Financial structure; product market competition.
JEL classiﬁcation: D80, G32, L13.
∗Both authors: Department of Economics, University of Groningen, P.O.Box
800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands. E-mail: m.a.haan@eco.rug.nl,
l.a.toolsema@eco.rug.nl. The authors thank Stephen Martin and Gabrielle Wanzenried
for useful discussion.
11 Introduction
In an interesting paper in the International Journal of Industrial Organi-
zation, Gabrielle Wanzenried (2003) studies the eﬀects of debt on product
market competition. In a simple duop o l ym o d e lw i t hd e m a n du n c e r t a i n t y
and diﬀerentiated products, she considers the incentives of ﬁrms to take
on debt, and also analyzes how equilibrium debt levels aﬀect equilibrium
prices, proﬁts and welfare. She looks at the eﬀects of a change in the degree
of substitutability between the products, and a change in the volatility of
demand.
Unfortunately however, her analysis is ﬂawed. In this paper, we correct
her results. In our analysis, we also avoid some other conceptual problems
that are present in this literature. It is not possible to solve the model
analytically. We therefore resort to numerical methods. We show that
solving the model correctly yields results that are qualitatively diﬀerent
from those reported by Wanzenried (2003). For example, we show that in
equilibrium, the use of debt always yields lower ﬁrm proﬁts, i.e. even in
the case of complements. Also, we show that the equilibrium debt level
decreases as demand becomes more volatile.
Brander and Lewis (1986) were the ﬁrst to show that the limited liabil-
ity associated with debt ﬁnancing aﬀects the strategic decisions of ﬁrms.
Firms holding debt will maximize their net proﬁts, i.e. their proﬁta f t e r
debt repayment. More debt then gives them an incentive to compete more
aggressively. Brander and Lewis (1986) showed that, in the case of Cournot
competition, this results in lower prices. For a more complete discussion of
and references to this literature, see Wanzenried (2003).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present
2Wanzenried’s model. Section 3 discusses the solution of that model with
Cournot competition. In section 4, we question some of the implicit as-
sumptions that are commonly made in the strategic debt literature. We
make some adjustments to the model to avoid these issues. Since it is not
possible to ﬁnd a closed-form solution for the model, we turn to a numerical
solution approach in section 5. That section also presents our main results.
The case of Bertrand competition is considered in section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 The model
Wanzenried (2003) considers a two-stage duopoly model with product dif-
ferentiation. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms choose their debt levels. In the second
stage, they compete on the product market by setting quantities. Marginal
costs of production are constant and normalized to zero. Inverse demand
is given by
pi = α − qi − γqj + zi, (1)
where pi is the price for ﬁrm i’s product, qi is the quantity set by ﬁrm
i,a n dzi represents an exogenous demand shock, for i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j.
The parameter α reﬂects the size of the market, and γ refers to the degree
of substitutability between the products, with γ ∈ [−1,1]. If γ>0, the
products are substitutes. With γ<0, they are complements. With γ =0 ,
each ﬁrm is a monopolist. The shock zi is uniformly distributed on [−z,z].
The shocks z1 and z2 are uncorrelated.1
In stage 1, ﬁrms can take on debt by borrowing from bondholders. We
1Alternatively, we could assume that both ﬁrms face a common shock zi. For the
case of Cournot competition, this does not aﬀect the results.
3denote by Si the debt of ﬁrm i. As usual, assume that ﬁrms choose their
debt levels in order to maximize total expected proﬁts. Given Sj, ﬁrm is
ﬁrst-stage maximization problem then is
max
Si
Z ¯ z
−¯ z
[(α − qi (Si,S j) − γqj (Sj,S i)+zi)qi (Si,S j)]
1
2¯ z
dzi, (2)
where qi(Si,S j)a n dqj(Si,S j) denote the equilibrium values of qi and qj
that will be set in stage 2, given the debt levels Si and Sj.
If a ﬁrm’s operating proﬁts fall short of its debt, then its net proﬁts are
zero, and all operating proﬁts go to bondholders. We thus have a critical
level of zi, denoted by b zi,f o rw h i c hﬁrm i is just able to repay its debt. If
zi < b zi, ﬁrm i’s operating proﬁts fall below its debt level. The critical debt
level b zi is implicitly deﬁned by
(α − qi − γqj + b zi)qi − Si =0 i =1 ,2,i 6= j. (3)
Wanzenried takes Si ≡ (1 + ri)Di, with Di the amount ﬁrm i receives in
period 1, and ri the interest rate. When solving the model numerically, we
will choose a slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcation (see section 4). For the purpose
of the next section, this is immaterial.
In stage 2, ﬁrms choose quantities, and debt levels are given. Firms max-
imize net proﬁts, i.e. the expected proﬁts after repayment of their debt.
The maximization problem of ﬁrm i is given by
max
qi
Z ¯ z
b zi
[(α − qi − γqj + zi)qi − Si]
1
2¯ z
dzi. (4)
43 Solving the model
We solve the model using backward induction. In stage 2, maximizing (4)
yields the ﬁrst-order condition
Z ¯ z
b zi
(α − 2qi − γqj + zi)
1
2¯ z
dzi−[(α − qi − γqj + b zi)qi − Si]
1
2¯ z
db zi
dqi
=0 . (5)
The second term vanishes because of (3). Solving this for qi,w eh a v e
qi (qj, b zi)=
1
4
¯ z +
1
2
α −
1
2
γqj +
1
4
b zi (qi,q j). (6)
From this, the output levels can be derived by determining the intersection
of the reaction functions qi (qj, b zi)a n dqj (qi, b zj). Note that the right-hand
side of this equality also depends on qi. In her next step, however, Wanzen-
ried (2003) disregards this fact. She eﬀectively assumes that b zi (qi,q j)=b zi,
and derives that
qi (b zi, b zj)=
1
2
2b zi − γb zj +( z +2 α)(2− γ)
4 − γ2 , (7)
which is her equation (3.4).2 This is incorrect. Note however that the
same mistake is made by Hughes et al. (1998) in a model which diﬀers
in some aspects of its speciﬁcation but is equivalent in essential elements.
Substituting b zi from (3) into (6) yields
qi =
1
4
z +
1
2
α −
1
2
γqj +
1
4
Ã
qi + γqj − α +
Si
qi
!
. (8)
Rewriting this yields the following reaction function for ﬁrm i, given its
debt level Si:
qi (qj)=
1
6
z +
1
6
α −
1
6
γqj +
1
6
q
(z + α − γqj)
2 +1 2 Si. (9)
2Note that Wanzenried (2003) has −2γb zj in the numerator of her (3.4), instead of
−γb zj.W et a k et h i st ob eat y p o . T h i si sc o n ﬁrmed by substituting b z∗ from her (3.6)
into our expression (7), which yields exactly the expression for q∗ that she gives in her
(3.7).
5It is not possible to ﬁnd a closed-form solution for the equilibrium out-
put levels for general values of Si and Sj,a st h i sr e q u i r e so n et os o l v ea
polynomial function of degree 4.
Finally, note that total welfare is given by
W =
Z ¯ z
−¯ z
Z ¯ z
−¯ z
·
(α + z1)q1 +( α + z2)q2 −
1
2
³
q
2
1 +2 γq1q2 + q
2
2
´¸ 1
4¯ z2dz1dz2.
(10)
Ap r i o r i ,ﬁrms are identical. We therefore expect the resulting equilibrium
quantities to be identical as well. Denote this value by q ≡ q1 = q2. We
then have
W =
Z ¯ z
−¯ z
Z ¯ z
−¯ z
h
2(α + z1)q − (1 + γ)q
2
i 1
4¯ z2dz1dz2
=2 αq − (1 + γ)q
2. (11)
4 Some other issues
There are two additional aspects in which our approach diﬀers from the
approach that is common in the literature.
First, the literature eﬀectively assumes that the amount of money that a
ﬁrm borrows is burnt. Wanzenried (2003, p. 176, (2.3)), for example, uses
the following equality to implicitly deﬁne b zi:
(α − qi − γqj + b zi)qi − Di (1 + ri)=0 i =1 ,2,i 6= j, (12)
so Si ≡ Di(1 + ri), using (3). Here, Di denotes the size of the loan of ﬁrm
i,a n dri the interest rate charged by its bondholders. Firm i thus receives
an amount Di in period 1, and promises to pay back Di(1 + ri)i np e r i o d
2. When a ﬁrm receives an amount Di in period 1, it can be put to several
uses. First, the ﬁrm can simply keep the funds. If it chooses to do so,
6then its reserves in period 2 will be higher, which implies that it will be
less likely to default on its debt. Its limited liability constraint (12) is then
relaxed. Alternatively, the ﬁrm’s owners or managers may expropriate the
money; Brander and Lewis (1988) argue that ”borrowed money is turned
over directly to shareholders” (p. 225). But if this is the case, then it will
have an eﬀect on the incentive to take on debt. Eﬀectively, the speciﬁcation
above implicitly assumes that the amount Di is burnt immediately after
receiving it: owners or managers do not obtain any utility from it, and
it does not relax the limited liability constraint. We therefore prefer the
following implicit deﬁnition of ˆ zi:
Di +( α − qi − γqj + b zi)qi − Di (1 + ri)=0 i =1 ,2,i 6= j. (13)
This assumes that a ﬁrm still has the amount of Di it initially received when
it is time to repay its debt: this amount is neither burned nor expropriated.
This immediately implies
(α − qi − γqj + b zi)qi − Diri =0 i =1 ,2,i 6= j. (14)
Therefore, we focus on the amount Si = Diri that the ﬁrm has to pay to the
creditors out of its operating proﬁts. We ignore the value of the loan itself,
since it is irrelevant from the point of view of the ﬁrm. For convenience,
we refer to Si as the ‘debt’ to the creditors of ﬁrm i.
Second, it is common in this literature to assume a competitive credit
market that yields zero expected proﬁts for bondholders (see e.g. Brander
and Lewis, 1986, p. 966, and Hughes et al., 1998, p. 72). Wanzenried
(2003, p. 175) uses this assumption to determine Di and ri. It is hard
to see, however, why in this context expected bondholder proﬁts would
be zero. The strategic eﬀect of debt is solely determined by the required
7repayment ﬁr m sh a v et om a k ea tt h ee n do fp e r i o d2 .A sa r g u e da b o v e ,ﬁrm
i is only interested in its debt Si, not in the amount of money it borrows,
Di. This can also be seen in the reaction functions (9). Creditors, however,
are interested in the value of Di. The expected repayment they receive
depends solely on Si. For a given value of Si, we thus have that the lower
Di, the higher the creditors’ expected proﬁts. If bondholders are price-
takers, it is hard to see why ﬁrms would oﬀer them a contract with a Di
that is such that bondholders’ expected proﬁts are exactly zero, especially
since ﬁrms are indiﬀerent with respect to the level of Di. If bondholders
can oﬀer contracts to ﬁrms, we have that for any contract (Di,S i)t h a t
yields a bondholder zero proﬁts, competing bondholders can oﬀer a contract
(D0
i,S i), with D0
i <D i, which yields them strictly positive proﬁts, and
which the ﬁrm is also willing to accept. In our results, we therefore focus
on Si = Diri,r a t h e rt h a no nDi, as Wanzenried (2003) does.
5S o l v i n g n u m e r i c a l l y
W en u m e r i c a l l ys o l v et h em o d e lu s i n gM A T L A B .W ed os of o ral a r g en u m -
ber of values for the parameters γ and ¯ z. Basically, we use two algorithms.3
Our second-stage algorithm takes as an input the parameters α, γ, and ¯ z,
and some debt levels S1 and S2, and uses (9) to ﬁnd the corresponding equi-
librium values of q1 and q2. The ﬁrst-stage algorithm takes as an input the
parameter values α,γ, and ¯ z, and some debt level Sj,a n dﬁnds the value
of Si which solves the ﬁrst-stage maximization problem (2). Note that this
optimization problem also depends on the values of q1 and q2 that will be
chosen in the second stage. Hence, for every candidate best-reply ˆ Si to the
3O b v i o u s l y ,t h e s ea r ea v a i l a b l ef rom the authors upon request.
8given Sj, this ﬁrst-stage algorithm invokes the second-stage algorithm to
calculate which values of q1 and q2 would be set in stage 2 when the vector
of debt levels were (ˆ Si,S j).
We use these algorithms to derive the equilibrium of the model described
above, for a grid of 200 values of γ on the interval [−1,1], and 200 values
of ¯ z on the interval (0, ¯ zmax]. This yields equilibria for 40,000 combinations
of parameter values. The entire exercise takes roughly 16 hours on a PC
with a 2.0 GHz Pentium 4 processor.
The output from our algorithm can be used to derive comparative static
results. Note that not all combinations of γ and ¯ z necessarily yield a
solution, as Wanzenried also notes. For example, for ¯ z small and γ either
close to 1 or close to −1, the reaction functions with respect to the debt
levels Si do not intersect within the feasible areas. With ¯ z large and γ high
enough, an equilibrium also does not exist. We have chosen to set ¯ zmax =1 ,
and α =2 . Choosing diﬀerent values does not lead to qualitatively diﬀerent
results. It merely aﬀects the size of the areas where an equilibrium does
not exist.
As a ﬁrst step, following Wanzenried, we compare the equilibria derived by
our algorithm to the equilibria of the benchmark case without debt. That
is, we compare our results to those for the case of fully equity ﬁnanced
ﬁrms (derived by Wanzenried, 2003, pp. 178-179). Note that such ﬁrms,
by assumption, have no limited liability and therefore can have negative
net proﬁts if the realization of the demand shock zi turns out to be very
low. This is not the case with ﬁrms that do take on debt, and have limited
liability.
Net expected ﬁrm proﬁts in equilibrium are given in the left-hand panel of
9Figure 1, for all values of γ and ¯ z that we consider.4 In equilibrium, the two
ﬁrms take on the same debt levels in stage 1, and set the same quantity in
stage 2. Hence, proﬁts are also equal for both ﬁrms. Naturally, equilibrium
proﬁts are only reported for those parameter values where an equilibrium
actually exists. The right-hand panel of Figure 1 gives the diﬀerence be-
tween these equilibrium proﬁts and the equilibrium proﬁts in a benchmark
model without debt. The proﬁtd i ﬀerence in Figure 1 is negative. In the
left-hand panel of Figure 2, we plot the equilibrium quantities, and in the
right-hand panel, the diﬀerence between these and those in the benchmark
case. In the model with debt, quantities are always lower. From (1), this
immediately implies that prices are always lower.5
- INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE -
We thus have the following:
Result 1 Debt issue induces ﬁrms to raise their output. Hence, prices
are lower than they are with a fully equity ﬁnanced capital structure. In
equilibrium, debt issue always yields lower ﬁrm proﬁts compared to a model
without the possibility of debt issue.
Note that this result holds for both substitutes (γ>0) and complements
(γ<0). Hence, this result is diﬀerent from Wanzenried’s (2003) Proposi-
tion 1, which claims that debt issue increases ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the case of
4For clarity of exposition, the ﬁgures are based on a 50 x 50 rather than a 200 x 200
grid. This, however, in no way aﬀects the shape of the reported surfaces.
5Strictly speaking, quantities are always weakly higher, and prices weakly lower.
They are equal when γ =0 .
10complements. The intuition is straightforward. As ﬁrst argued by Brander
and Lewis (1986), more debt induces ﬁrms to compete more aggressively,
that is, to set higher quantities which implies lower prices. Clearly, debt
issue is a prisoner’s dilemma: in equilibrium both ﬁrms unilaterally choose
to take on debt, yet they would be better oﬀ when they could both commit
n o tt od os o .
- INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE -
Figure 3 gives the equilibrium debt level for our model, S∗,a saf u n c t i o n
of γ and ¯ z. From close inspection of this graph6, this yields
Result 2 For the equilibrium debt level S∗,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :
1. For intermediate values of ¯ z, there is a γ∗(¯ z) > 0 such that S∗ is
decreasing in γ for γ<γ ∗(¯ z), a n di n c r e a s i n gf o rγ>γ ∗(¯ z). For
extreme values of ¯ z, the debt S∗ is decreasing in γ for all feasible
values of γ.
2. S∗ is decreasing in ¯ z.
The ﬁr s th a l fo fP a r t1c o n ﬁrms Wanzenried’s Proposition 2, which states
that the debt level is decreasing in γ for γ<γ ∗, and increasing otherwise.
For extreme values of ¯ z however, we ﬁnd that S∗ is always decreasing in
γ. Part 2 is opposite to Wanzenried’s Proposition 4: we ﬁnd that the debt
6Admittedly, part of this result is hardly discernible in the ﬁgure as we present it
here. Equilibrium values of S∗ for all values of γ and ¯ z are available from the authors
upon request.
11level is decreasing in ¯ z, rather than increasing, as she claims. The intuition
is as follows. A higher value of ¯ z implies more uncertainty. Ceteris paribus,
this has no eﬀect on ˆ zi, but does increase expected demand conditional on
zi > ˆ zi. This implies that both ﬁrms will set a higher quantity. Hence, an
increase in ¯ z induces the ﬁrms to act even more aggressively, as can also
be seen from (9). To get the same strategic eﬀect, it now suﬃces to have
a lower level of debt. In equilibrium, this implies a lower probability of
bankruptcy, as we will show later.
One could suspect that we get a qualitatively diﬀerent result merely because
our deﬁnition of the debt level is diﬀerent from that in Wanzenried. This,
however, is not the case, as can be seen as follows. Comparing (3) and
(12), our Si can be interpreted as her (1 + ri)Di. Wanzenried derives Di
by setting the net expected bondholder proﬁts to zero, which is equivalent
to setting Di equal to gross bondholder proﬁts. Gross bondholder proﬁts
can easily be calculated from our analysis by taking the diﬀerence between
total expected proﬁts as given in (2), and net expected ﬁrm proﬁts as given
in (4). Careful inspection reveals that this variable is also decreasing in ¯ z.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.
- INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE -
Figure 5 shows the probability of bankruptcy, which in equilibrium is simply
given by θ ≡ Pr(z<ˆ z).
Result 3 For the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy θ, we have the fol-
lowing:
121. With complements (γ<0), θ is decreasing in γ. With substitutes
(γ>0)i ti si n c r e a s i n gi nγ.
2. The probability of bankruptcy θ is decreasing in ¯ z, for γ 6=0 . With
γ =0 , ¯ z does not aﬀect θ.
The eﬀect of a change in γ conﬁrms Wanzenried’s Proposition 3. The eﬀect
of a change in ¯ z is a new result: this issue was not analyzed by Wanzenried.
We ﬁnd that higher uncertainty implies that the equilibrium probability of
bankruptcy is lower. The intuition follows from that of Result 2: with
higher uncertainty, the same strategic eﬀect can be achieved with a lower
level of debt. In itself, a lower level of debt implies a lower probability of
bankruptcy. Yet, ceteris paribus, a higher level of uncertainty implies a
higher probability of bankruptcy. We thus have two countervailing eﬀects.
In this model, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.
- INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE -
Figure 6 shows the welfare eﬀect, which is similar to that reported by
Wanzenried:
Result 4 Using debt ﬁnancing implies higher welfare as compared to the
case of fully equity ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
6 The Bertrand case
For the Bertrand case the demand function of ﬁrm i, (1), can be rewritten
as
qi =
α
1+γ
+
zi − γzj
1 − γ2 +
−pi + γpj
1 − γ2 . (15)
13Because ﬁrm i’s demand now depends on zj, the analysis for the case with
uncorrelated shocks will be more complicated now (note that Wanzenried,
2003, equation (A.1), simply redeﬁnes the term involving the shocks as the
‘new’ zi). We therefore focus on the case of a common (perfectly correlated)
shock7, zi = zj = z,s ow eh a v e
qi =
α + z
1+γ
+
−pi + γpj
1 − γ2 . (16)
The reaction functions can now be derived as
pi (pj)=
1
6
(1 − γ)(α + z)+
1
6
γpj
+
1
6
q
((1 − γ)(α + z)+γpj)
2 +1 2( 1− γ2)Si. (17)
We can derive b z, the critical value of the shock for which the ﬁrm can just
repay its debt, from
Ã
α + b z
1+γ
+
−pi + γpj
1 − γ2
!
pi − Si =0 . (18)
Expected proﬁts of ﬁrm i in equilibrium are given by
Z z
b z
1
2¯ z
ÃÃ
α + b z
1+γ
+
−pi + γpj
1 − γ2
!
pi − Si
!
dz, (19)
and expected total proﬁts (including bondholders’ proﬁts) equal
Z z
−¯ z
1
2¯ z
Ã
α + b z
1+γ
+
−pi + γpj
1 − γ2
!
pidz. (20)
In the symmetric equilibrium we have
q
∗ =
α + z − p∗
1+γ
, (21)
7As noted earlier, the analysis of the Cournot case is identical regardless of whether
shocks are perfectly correlated or uncorrelated.
14so expected welfare is given by
Z z
−z
h
2(α + z1)q
∗ − (1 + γ)q
∗2
i 1
2z
dz =
α2 + z2/3 − p∗2
1+γ
. (22)
Finally, in the benchmark case (without limited liability), we have an equi-
librium price of
(1−γ)α
2−γ , and expected ﬁrm proﬁts equal to
(1−γ)α2
(2−γ)2(1+γ).
Using these expressions, we can use a numerical approach similar to that
described above to derive results for the Bertrand case.
Result 5 With Bertrand competition, we have the following:
1. Debt issue induces ﬁrms to raise their price. Hence, quantities are
lower than they are with a fully equity ﬁnanced capital structure. In
equilibrium, debt issue always yields lower proﬁts as compared to a
model without the possibility of debt issue.
2. For the equilibrium debt level S∗:
(a) There is a ¯ z∗ such that for ¯ z ≤ ¯ z∗, we have that S∗ is decreasing
in γ. For any ¯ z>¯ z∗, there exist γ∗(¯ z) and γ∗∗(¯ z) such that S∗
is increasing for γ∗(¯ z) <γ<γ ∗∗(¯ z), a n dd e c r e a s i n go t h e r w i s e .
(b) S∗ is decreasing in ¯ z.
3. For the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy θ:
(a) With complements (γ<0), θ is decreasing in γ. With substitutes
(γ>0)i ti si n c r e a s i n gi nγ.
(b) θ is decreasing in ¯ z, for γ 6=0 . With γ =0 , ¯ z does not aﬀect θ.
154. Using debt ﬁnancing implies lower welfare as compared to the case of
fully equity ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
Figures 7-12 illustrate these results.
- INSERT FIGURES 7 THROUGH 12 ABOUT HERE -
Compared to the case of Cournot competition we thus have that prices are
higher with debt ﬁnancing, rather than lower. Note that this is conﬁrmed
by Showalter (1995): he shows that with Bertrand competition and demand
uncertainty, prices increase when debt is issued. As a result, welfare is now
lower with debt ﬁnancing. The other results are qualitatively similar to
those with Cournot competition.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we corrected the results in Wanzenried’s (2003) model of
the strategic eﬀects of debt on product market competition in a duopoly
with demand uncertainty and diﬀerentiated products. We also addressed
some other conceptual problems in the strategic debt literature. First,
this literature implicitly assumes that a loan obtained in period 1 is burnt
immediately after receiving it: owners or managers do not obtain any utility
from it, and it does not relax the limited liability constraint. Second, the
common assumption of zero expected proﬁts for bondholders is hard to
justify.
In the case of Cournot competition, the main results of our analysis are the
following. Debt issue leads ﬁrms to increase their quantity, leading to lower
16prices. Equilibrium proﬁts are lower in a model with debt issue than in one
without that possibility. Equilibrium debt levels decrease with the degree
of substitutability when products are complements. With substitutes, the
eﬀect is ambiguous. Equilibrium debt levels are decreasing in the extent of
uncertainty. The equilibrium probability of bankruptcy is minimized when
the degree of substitutability between products is zero, and increases when
products either become closer substitutes, or stronger complements. The
equilibrium probability of bankruptcy is decreasing in the extent of uncer-
tainty. Debt ﬁnance leads to higher welfare. With Bertrand competition,
prices increase and welfare decreasesi nam o d e lw i t hd e b ti s s u e .T h eo t h e r
results are qualitatively similar to the case of Cournot competition.
In the case of Cournot competition, we thus ﬁnd two results that are qual-
itatively diﬀerent from those that Wanzenried (2003) reports. First, in
equilibrium, the use of debt always yields lower ﬁrm proﬁts, i.e. even in
the case of complements. Second, the equilibrium debt level decreases as
demand becomes more volatile. We also showed that more volatile de-
mand leads to a lower equilibrium probability of bankruptcy. In the case
of Bertrand competition, we ﬁn dt h es a m eq u a l i t a t i v ed i ﬀerences.
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Figure 1: Net expected ﬁrm proﬁts (left), and the diﬀerence between ﬁrm
proﬁts and the benchmark model equivalent (right). This diﬀerence is
always negative, so ﬁrm proﬁts in our model fall below the benchmark ﬁrm
proﬁts.
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 0
0.5
1
0
1
2
3
_
z
γ
q
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 0
0.5
1 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
_
z
γ
∆
 
q
Figure 2: Equilibrium quantity q∗ (left), and the diﬀerence between equi-
librium quantity and the benchmark model equivalent (right). For γ =0 ,
this diﬀerence equals zero; for all other values of γ it is positive, so the
equilibrium quantity in our model exceeds the benchmark quantity.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium debt level S∗.
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Figure 4: Bondholder proﬁts.
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Figure 5: Bankruptcy probability θ.
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Figure 6: Welfare (left), and the diﬀerence between welfare and the bench-
mark model equivalent (right). For γ =0 ,t h i sd i ﬀerence equals zero; for
all other values of γ it is positive, so welfare in our model exceeds the
benchmark welfare.
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Figure 7: The Bertrand case: Net expected ﬁrm proﬁts (left), and the
diﬀerence between ﬁrm proﬁts and the benchmark model equivalent (right).
This diﬀerence is always negative, so ﬁrm proﬁts in our model fall below
the benchmark ﬁrm proﬁts.
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Figure 8: The Bertrand case: Equilibrium price p∗ (left), and the diﬀerence
between equilibrium price and the benchmark model equivalent (right). For
γ =0 ,t h i sd i ﬀerence equals zero; for all other values of γ it is positive, so
equilibrium price in our model exceeds the benchmark price.
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Figure 9: The Bertrand case: Equilibrium debt level S∗.
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Figure 10: The Bertrand case: Bondholder proﬁts.
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Figure 11: The Bertrand case: Bankruptcy probability θ.
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Figure 12: The Bertrand case: Welfare (left), and the diﬀerence between
welfare and the benchmark model equivalent (right). For γ =0 ,t h i sd i f -
ference equals zero; for all other values of γ it is negative, so welfare in our
model falls below the benchmark welfare.
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